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In this article, we examine the benefits that accrue to policyholders and incumbent 
insurers from an active secondary market for life insurance policies.  We begin by 
examining the benefits of secondary markets in other financial service industries, including 
home mortgages, catastrophic risk insurance, and Nasdaq-listed securities. Next, we outline 
the economic theory of a life insurance market both before and after the introduction of a 
secondary market. Without an active secondary market, the equilibrium quantity of 
impaired policies that  is surrendered is inefficiently low. Although competition among 
insurance companies in the primary market leads to reasonably competitive surrender 
values given normal health, surrender values based on normal health do not appropriately 
compensate individuals with impaired life expectancies for the resulting appreciation of 
their policies. If there is no external market for reselling policies, insurers have no incentive 
to adjust their surrender values for impaired policies to competitive levels because they 
wield monopsony power over the repurchase of “impaired” policies. Viatical and life 
settlement firms erode this monopsony power. Finally, we examine the benefits of an active 
secondary market for life insurance policies to policyholders and incumbent insurers in the 
primary market. The magnitude of the benefits is positively correlated to the quantity of 
coverage sold to life settlement firms and to the improvement in the terms of accelerated 
death benefits offered by incumbent carriers. We conclude that the incumbent life insurance 
carriers’ efforts to deter entry by life settlement firms are motivated by the anticompetitive 
desire to maintain monopsony power over policyholders. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of a robust secondary market for life insurance is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.
1 The modern market arose in the late 1980s 
in response to the AIDS epidemic, as many young people were faced with 
the sudden need for money to pay for medical treatment and maintain their 
standard of living. These individuals sought liquidity from any long-term 
assets that they owned, including life insurance policies. The shortened life 
horizons of those living with AIDS meant that the actuarial values of their 
policies—that is the risk-adjusted value of the death benefit, taking into 
account future costs—had come to significantly exceed the policies’ 
surrender values.
2  
 Unfortunately for these individuals, incumbent life insurance 
companies wielded monopsony power
3 over the repurchase of their own 
                                                 
1.   A few policyholders did sell their policies to individual speculators prior 
to the advent of viatical and life settlement firms. This early market, however, was 
largely underground, and was not a viable option for most policyholders because 
such a sale of a policy gave no safeguards against the financial interest in the 
policyholder’s early death that the transaction provided the individual purchasing 
the policy. These elements of the early market may, in fact, have contributed to the 
negative regulatory aura that still lingers to some extent around the modern 
market. Although some viatical firms continue to match individual investors with 
individual policies, many of the top firms in the market now aggregate policies 
into diversified pools, which prevents investors from knowing the individual 
identities of the individuals whose policies they now hold. See Stephen Rae, AIDS: 
Still Waiting, N.Y. TIMES at 6 (July 19, 1998). 
2.  When a policy becomes impaired, the present value of the death benefit 
increases because it will occur sooner than originally projected. At the same time, 
the present value of premium payments decreases, because they will not continue 
for as long as originally projected. Both effects cause an increase in the actuarial 
value of a policy for an individual with a shortened lifespan. 
3.   The term ‘monopsony’ refers to a firm that is the only purchaser of 
goods or services in a given market.  See  DENNIS  W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.    
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policies. As a result of this imbalance of bargaining power,
4 the insurance 
companies have historically earned economic rents on the repurchase of 
impaired policies
5  In the case of the lapse of  a term-life policy, a 
policyholder who could no longer afford premium payments simply lost 
his insurance coverage and received nothing. In the case of the surrender of 
a universal- or whole-life policy, the pre-determined schedule of surrender 
values offered by the insurance company (representing at most the reserve 
set aside to fund future insurance costs at standard rates) did not 
compensate a policyholder for the full actuarial value of the impaired 
policy. Investors who did not share the same liquidity constraints as the 
policyholders were willing to purchase those policies for substantially 
more than the pre-arranged termination terms offered by the insurance 
companies. Viatical f irms emerged to facilitate these sales, and the 
secondary market for life insurance was born. 
Viatical firms facilitate the liquidity goals of individuals living with 
terminal illnesses by making lump-sum payments to them and matching 
their life insurance  policies with investors. Policyholders benefit  from 
improvements in the quality of their final days, and investors benefit by 
acquiring investment to a previously inaccessible asset class. The viatical 
industry has grown rapidly since the early 1990s. According to the Viatical 
Association of America, between $1.8 billion and $4.0 billion of policies 
were viaticated in 2001,
6 up from $50 million in 1990 and $1.0 billion as 
recently as 1999.
7 Perhaps the only shortcoming of the secondary market 
for insurance policies (other than company-specific irregularities in sales 
and investment practices) has been that the investment criteria of viatical 
firms have typically provided access to the secondary market only to 
policyholders with life expectancies of less than two years.
8 
                                                                                                                
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 105-07 (Addison-Wesley, 3d ed. 
2000).  
4.  The surrender of a policy is a purchase because the obligation of the life 
insurance carrier to pay the policyholder a certain face value at the maturity of the 
contract constitutes a property right of the policyholder, and thus, an asset. The 
extinguishment of this obligation by the insurance carrier results from its 
acquisition of the policyholder’s asset, and is thus a purchase. For this reason, 
even a lapse represents a purchase (for zero price). 
5.   The terms “normal” and “impaired” are used throughout this paper to 
refer to an individual’s state of health (and the corresponding state of that 
individual’s life insurance policy). “Normal” health refers to the state of an 
individual’s health relative to that individual’s health at issuance. Similarly, the 
term “impaired” health refers to a state of health that is impaired relative to the 
state of health at issuance.  
6.  Erich W. Sippel and Alan H. Buerger, A Free Market for Life Insurance, 
CONTINGENCIES at 18 (Mar. 2002) (citing studies by Erich Sippel & Company and 
the Viatical Association of America). 
7.  Carrie Coolidge,  Death Wish Investors in Insurance Policies for the 
Terminally Ill are Watching Their Capital Get Annihilated, FORBES at 206 (Mar 
19, 2001). 
8.  The annual rate of return on a life insurance policy purchased by a 
viatical firm is the excess of the policy’s face value over the price offered to the 
policyholder, divided by future lifespan of the individual insured by the policy. 
The risk associated with the purchase of policies is the probability of unexpected      
 




The market responded to this shortcoming when, around the 
millennium, “life settlement” firms emerged to create access to the market 
for substantially more policyholders. The rise of life settlements in an 
industry that had previously focused  primarily on the policies of AIDS 
patients can be traced to the fact that better AIDS drugs in the mid 1990s 
increased the lives of afflicted individuals and made the purchase of these 
policies less profitable. This change in the financial calculus of viatical 
settlements led to a search for new areas of growth.
9 Life settlement firms 
have developed more sophisticated underwriting models that allow them to 
purchase policies from individuals who are not terminally ill. In fact, life 
settlement firms do not p urchase policies from individuals who are 
terminally ill.
10 Rather, life settlement firms purchase policies from 
individuals who are over the age of 65, have experienced a decline in 
health, and have remaining life expectancies of between six and twelve 
years (although in some cases life expectancies outside this range are 
considered).
11 Given the relative infancy of the life settlement industry, it is 
plausible that as the industry matures life settlements will become available 
to even more policyholders. 
More than 20 percent of policyholders over the age of 65 are estimated 
to hold policies whose economic values exceed their cash surrender 
values.
12 Conning and Co., an insurance industry researcher, concluded 
that the total value of life insurance policies held by senior citizens is $492 
                                                                                                                
longevity on the part of the insured, which spreads the “gain” from the policy’s 
purchase over a larger number of years, thus reducing the rate of return. 
Breakthroughs in AIDS treatments in the mid nineties significantly increased the 
life expectancies of individuals living with AIDS, and created a greater variance in 
the risk associated with what had previously been a fairly predictable disease. 
9.  David W Dunlap, AIDS Drugs Alter an Industry’s Math, N.Y. TIMES at 
D-1 (July 30, 1996). 
10.  Retirement Protection: Fighting Fraud in the Sale of Death: Hearing 
Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 107th Cong. 66 
(2002) (written statement of David M. Lewis, representing the Life Settlement 
Institute). 
11.  See Id.; Lynn Asinof, Your Pocketbook: Selling Off Life Insurance: Good 
Policy?  – It Can Be for Seniors Who No Longer Need It, But Some Financial 
Advisors Are Skeptical,  WALL.  ST.  J. at D2 (May 15, 2002);  Seniors Should 
Exercise Caution When Considering Life Settlements,  ASSOC.  PRESS (Feb. 8, 
2001) (citing Michael Snowdon, academic associate at the College of Financial 
Planning); see also Juan Hovey, Special to the Times, L. A. TIMES at C3 (Apr. 30, 
2001) (citing Michael Cavalier Sr., president and CEO of Cavalier Associates 
Insurance Services) (explaining that life settlement firms prefer policies with face 
values of $500,000 or greater, and policies for which the cash value is no more 
than 40 percent of the death benefit). 
12.  Press Release, Coventry First, Coventry First Applauds New 
Pennsylvania Viatical Settlements Law: Pennsylvania Senior to Benefit (Sept. 10, 
2002).    
 
October 2002]  Secondary Life Insurance Markets  5 
 
 
billion, which means that the potential market for life settlements is close 
to $100 billion.
13 
Life settlements are one of several life insurance innovations through 
which companies that develop innovative actuarial analyses have been able 
to glean profits through their superior ability to assess mortality and other 
risks. In this sense, life settlements are essentially similar to innovations 
introduced in prior generations, such as the differentiation between 
smokers and non-smokers that began in the 1980s. However, unlike most 
prior innovations in the insurance industry, which sought to “skim” the 
healthiest (that is, the least risky) patients from the pool, life settlements 
actually benefit those who have become greater-than-average risks.
14 
Moreover, because the existence of a secondary market for life insurance 
has improved the liquidity of all life insurance policies that might 
potentially qualify for settlement, the secondary market makes policies in 
the primary market more valuable for all consumers, regardless of their 
current state of health.  
As more policyholders become aware of the opportunities presented by 
viatical and life settlements, and as it becomes possible for more 
policyholders to obtain the fair market value of their policies, consumers 
will perceive an increase in the quality of life insurance, which will have a 
positive effect on the demand for life insurance.
15 This observation is fairly 
intuitive—consider how the demand for housing would decrease if 
purchasers could sell their house back to  only  the original seller.  The 
secondary market for life insurance effectively removes such a restriction 
on resale. Thus, the benefits of the secondary market are not limited to 
consumers in the secondary market, but also include consumers, insurance 
agents, and life insurance companies in the primary market for life 
insurance. In this paper, we refer to this effect as the “pro-competitive” 
hypothesis. 
The incumbent life insurance companies offer an alternative, anti-
competitive hypothesis. The incumbent insurance carriers claim that the 
secondary market, by denying them the returns—that is, economic rent on 
                                                 
13.  Teresa Dixon Murray, Viaticals Carry Risk of Fraud, State Warns Betting 
On Death Unwise, Experts Say, PLAIN DEAL REPORTER, at G1 (Mar. 31, 2002). 
14.  Some accounts of the viatical and life settlement industry claim that it is 
possible for healthy people to viaticate their policies. However, an individual’s 
health must almost always be impaired in order to sell a policy for more than its 
cash surrender value. As Doug Head of the Viatical and Life Settlement 
Association of America explains, by “healthy,” the industry actually means “a 
little sick,” or “won’t live to full life expectancy.” Jane Bryant Quinn,  Staying 
Ahead: “Life Settlements” Not Easy Money for Seller or Buyer,  S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL at D3 (May 15, 2001). Substandard life annuities, which have enjoyed 
significant growth since their inception, are another innovation in the insurance 
industry aimed at serving the needs of individuals with impaired health.  
15.  Indeed, much of the potential secondary market for life insurance 
policies, which JE McGowan Consulting estimates at greater than $18 billion 
annually, remains untapped. Neil Alexander,  New Value in Old Policies,  J. 
ACCOUNTANCY  ONLINE (Oct. 2001), downloaded on Sept. 19, 2002 at 
<http://www.cpa2biz.com/ResourceCenters/Personal+Financial+Planning/Insuran
ce+Planning/New+Value+in+Old+Policies.htm>.      
 




lapsing or surrendered policies of no-longer standard insureds—they 
formerly received, increases the costs of providing policies in the primary 
market. The incumbent carriers allege that these costs will either be passed 
on to consumers in the form of higher premiums, or absorbed by the 
incumbents as a result of an “unhealthy” level of competition fostered by 
the robust secondary market for life insurance policies. Such “unhealthy” 
competition, the carriers assert,  could lead to insolvency in the life 
insurance industry. Either way, the incumbent carriers claim that 
consumers will be made worse off, on net. 
This anticompetitive argument rests on the notion that the introduction 
of a secondary market will increase the cost of providing coverage for a 
given premium and surrender value.
16 Although some increase in cost can 
be expected, the issue of cost is tangential to the issue of consumer welfare, 
and an increase in cost does not imply any negative effect on consumer 
welfare. The incumbent carriers’ argument ignores (1) the demand effects 
of an active secondary market for life insurance policies, and (2) the 
distribution of a portion of the previous deadweight loss to policyholders.  
In Part II, we first analyze the impact of the emergence of a secondary 
market on consumers and producers in the primary market in the related 
industries of home mortgages, catastrophic risk insurance, and Nasdaq-
listed securities. We draw parallels between these markets and the 
secondary market for life insurance, and explain why consumers in the 
primary market for life insurance should benefit accordingly. 
In Part III, we examine the benefits of secondary markets in the life 
insurance industry. We begin by explaining that, before the advent of a 
secondary market, incumbent insurance companies wielded monopsony 
power over policyholders for the purchase of impaired policies. Next, we 
examine the e ffects of entry by viatical and life settlement firms on 
consumers. We perform a theoretical examination of the economic effects 
of secondary market entry in the life insurance industry, which leads us to 
conclude that the pro-competitive hypothesis is the valid explanation of 
such entry.  We estimate that life settlements, alone, generate surplus 
benefits in excess of $240 million annually for life insurance policyholders 
who have exercised their option to sell their policies at a competitive rate. 
This estimate is little more than the proverbial tip of the iceberg, for it not 
only fails to account for the corresponding benefits from viatical sales and 
accelerated death benefits (ADBs),
17 but also does not include the benefits 
                                                 
16.  However, if these economic rents obtained by insurance companies are 
perceived as windfall gains—that is, if insurance companies do not account for 
profitable lapses when setting premiums—then the introduction of a secondary 
market for impaired life insurance policies will merely return the profits of 
insurance carriers to their expected levels, and will not result in higher premiums.  
17.   Incumbent carriers have reacted  to secondary market entry with 
accelerated death benefit contracts, which give policyholders the option to receive 
a portion of their death benefits when their life expectancies fall below a threshold 
level. Because these benefits would not have been available to policyholders in the 
absence of a secondary market for life insurance policies, they should properly be    
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the secondary market for life insurance policies generates for customers in 
the primary market. 
In Part IV, we examine the rent-seeking behavior of incumbent life 
insurance companies. We explain how life settlement firms compete with 
life insurance companies in the secondary market for l ife insurance 
policies. Next, we review  the efforts  of incumbent life insurance 
companies to stymie entry into the secondary market. We conclude that the 
actions  of incumbent life insurance companies amount to an attempted 
boycott of life settlement firms, and represent  an effort to maintain 




II.  THE BENEFITS OF SECONDARY MARKETS IN FINANCIAL SERVICE 
INDUSTRIES 
 
Microeconomic theory reveals that an efficient secondary market for a 
particular good or asset will improve the value of that good or asset in the 
primary market. Professors Dennis N. Carlton of the University of Chicago 
and Jeffrey M. Perloff of the University of California at Berkeley explain 
the economic rationale as follows: 
 
When resales are possible, the price that consumers are willing to pay for 
a durable good depends on both the value of the services of the durable 
good during the period that consumer owns it and the resale value at the 
end of that period. That is, consumers’ expectations about the future 
resale price affect the initial price.
18 
 
The creation of a secondary  market or the enhancement of an existing 
secondary market improves the value of the underlying good to consumers 
by making it a more liquid asset. 
In this section, we examine the effects of the emergence of a robust 
secondary market in three financial industries: home mortgages, 
catastrophic risk insurance and Nasdaq-listed securities. These industries 
share similar features with the life insurance industry, and thus provide 
useful insights into the benefits of the creation of a secondary market for 
life insurance. 
Table 1 outlines the effects of enhancements in the secondary market 
for home mortgage payments, catastrophic risk, and Nasdaq-listed 
securities. For each industry, the table identifies the consumers and 
producers in the primary and secondary market, and describes the benefit 
owing to the enhancements in the secondary market. 
 
                                                                                                                
considered in an evaluation of the positive economic effect of secondary market 
entry. 
18.  CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 3, at 485.      
 




TABLE 1: THE EFFECTS OF A ROBUST SECONDARY MARKET IN FINANCIAL 
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Note: * Although a homebuyer purchases a mortgage, he also supplies an 
associated stream of payments, which represent the asset for sale in the secondary 
market. Because this asset is the focus of our analysis, the homebuyer is the 
supplier in the primary market. For similar reasons, the policyholder is the supplier 
in the primary market for catastrophe risk. 
 
As Table 1 shows, life settlement and viatical firms in the life insurance 
industry play a similar role to entrants in other financial services industries. 
Note that, for each industry, the consumer in the primary market becomes 
the supplier of the asset in the secondary market. For example, in the case 
of Nasdaq-listed securities, the institutional investor serves as consumer of 
initial public offerings (IPOs) in the primary market, but serves as supplier 
of shares in the Nasdaq over the counter (secondary) market. In all four 
cases, entry in the secondary market increases demand in the primary 
market and, as a result, increases the price of the asset in the primary 
market. Moreover, the enhancement of the secondary market adds 
liquidity, and thereby lowers transactions costs between buyers and sellers.    
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A.  Home Mortgages 
The secondary home mortgage market is credited with allowing 
millions of Americans to enjoy the benefits of home ownership. Before the 
Great Depression, home buyers were typically obligated to make a down 
payment of 40 percent of the value of the home and to pay off a mortgage 
in three to five years.
19 In 1934, Congress established the Federal Housing 
Authority (FHA) to issue insurance on long-term, fixed rate mortgages. 
Due to the unpopularity of these types of mortgages with both lenders and 
investors, Congress established Fannie Mae in 1938 to refinance FHA 
insured mortgages. Fannie Mae became a private corporation in 1968, but 
part of the organization was carved out to become Ginnie Mae, which 
remained a government entity and began offering mortgage-backed 
securities.
20 
The underlying asset with which the secondary market for home loans 
is concerned is not the loan itself, but rather the associated stream of 
payments made by the homeowner over the life of the mortgage. Thus, for 
our purposes, the consumers in this market are the mortgage lenders and 
the suppliers are the homebuyers. The asset in this market is risky because 
if the homeowner defaults on the mortgage (or prepays the outstanding 
amount), the lending institution stands to lose a considerable amount on the 
transaction. 
Most home loans involve a substantial amount of money and have a 
long duration. Consider the case of a lending institution that issues home 
mortgages. I f investors  were  to withdraw savings funds from  that 
institution,  the lender could not withdraw from its loan positions in 
response, absent a secondary market for home mortgages. Thus, before the 
advent of the secondary market for home mortgages, a mortgage lender 
faced a high risk of insolvency as a result of  its exposure to default by 
homebuyers, an occurrence referred to as credit risk. A lending institution 
that faces significant credit risk is not willing to extend the amount of 
credit of which it was capable because i f its lending capacity should 
decline in the future, it would not be able to withdraw from its current 
loans. 
The government created a secondary market for home mortgages under 
the theory that, although home purchases are local in nature, such a market 
would allow regions with a low savings rates to access funds from regions 
with excess savings. The government hoped that an active secondary 
market for home mortgages would increase liquidity and cause an outward 
shift in demand for home mortgage payments by financial institutions. This 
increased demand was expected to bring more competitors to the market 
and increase the price paid by financial institutions (which can be stated 
alternately as lower costs of mortgages for homebuyers). 
                                                 
19.  A rudimentary secondary mortgage market developed in the 1920s, but 
when the Great Depression began, home owners defaulted on their mortgages and 
the market collapsed. 
20.  Ginnie Mae,  About Ginnie Mae—History of the Secondary Mortgage 
Market (visited  Aug. 30, 2002) 
<http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/History.asp?Section=About>.      
 




These hopes were realized many times over. Numerous economic 
studies have shown that the secondary market for home mortgages has 
greatly benefited homebuyers. For example, a 2002 Lexecon study found 
that mortgage rates were lower in markets served by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, and that the demand for mortgages in these markets was 
higher than in markets where the agencies were not eligible to participate.
21 
The authors also observed a discrete decline in the number of mortgages 
whenever the size of the mortgage exceeded the purchasing limits of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
22 In addition, the study found that 
homebuyers adjusted their financing strategies to take advantage of the 
lower rates available in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac markets.
23 
The creation of a secondary market for home m ortgages provided 
mortgage lenders with access t o other financial institutions  who also 
demanded home mortgage contracts from homeowners. The willingness of 
these institutions to purchase home mortgages from their original issuers 
mitigated credit risk to mortgage lenders. Furthermore, the securitization of 
lenders’ positions in home mortgages involved their packaging into less 
risky assets because the pooling of policies minimized the impact of a 
single default on the value of the asset. Because mortgage l enders could 
escape from loans by reselling them for their market val ue on the 
secondary market, these lenders were willing to extend greater credit—that 
is, their demand for home mortgage contracts increased. It was this demand 
effect that led to the reduction in home mortgage interest rates, but it is 
perhaps more accurate to think of this reduction in interest rates as an 
increase in the price that mortgage lenders (the consumers) were willing to 
pay for the stream of mortgage payments by homeowners (the suppliers).
24 
Several studies have examined the effects of securitization on the 
various cost aspects of mortgages, such as interest rates, origination fees, 
and home insurance (which are various aspects of the  prices paid by 
financial institutions to acquire streams of mortgage payments from 
customers). Professor Steven Todd of Loyola University of Chicago 
examined the effects of mortgage securitization on transaction costs and 
found that securitization lowers loan origination fees, which results in 
substantial savings for homebuyers.
25 Three professors at Texas A&M 
University found that securitization reduces the interest rates of home 
loans: “a 10 percent increase in the level of mortgage securitization as a 
                                                 
21.  Dennis W. Carlton, David B. Gross, and Robert S. Stillman,  The 
Competitive Effects of Fannie Mae, 1 FANNIE MAE PAPERS 1 (Jan. 2002). 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  The highest price which a lender would rationally be willing to pay for a 
stream of payments is the expected future risk-free interest rate. The more risky a 
particular steam of payments is, the less the lender will be willing to pay for them, 
and hence, the higher an interest rate the lender will insist upon for the loan.  
25.  Steven Todd, The Effects of Securitization on Consumer Mortgage Costs, 
29 REAL ESTATE ECON. 29 (Spring 2001).    
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proportion of total mortgage originations decreases yield spreads on home 
loans by as much as 20 basis points.”
26 
B.  Catastrophic Risk Insurance 
It is also possible to draw parallels from the secondary market for 
catastrophic risk insurance to the secondary market for life insurance. The 
asset sold on the secondary market for catastrophic risk insurance is the 
insurance company’s position in a policy—in essence, the excess of the 
present discounted value of payments by a policyholder over the present 
discounted value of the potential liability.  Insurance  companies sell 
portions of their positions in catastrophic risk insurance on the secondary 
market primarily for hedging purposes. The securitization of catastrophic 
risk insurance has improved the liquidity of an insurance company’s 
position in a catastrophic risk policy, and has thus provided a new financial 
vehicle to insurance firms to hedge against downside risk. In many ways, 
this new vehicle, which involves the sale and purchase of catastrophic risk 
futures, is superior to the previous method of obtai ning reinsurance.  
The additional hedging made possible by securitization has reduced 
insurance companies’ exposure to catastrophe risk and allowed issuing 
firms to extend more insurance than they could previously. Sara Borden 
and Asani Sarkar of New York’s Federal Reserve Bank explain the 
benefits simply: “by establishing a direct link between the insurance 
industry and the capital market, catastrophe risk instruments introduce the 
strategic advantages of the financial markets to the insurance industry.”
27 
Catastrophe risk insurance first became securitized in 1992, and in 
1993 the Chicago Board of Trade began trading a contract for this risk. 
Before securitization, the only methods for an insurance company to 
transfer catastrophe risk were to spread the risk (by allocating it across a 
large number of policyholders) or to purchase reinsurance.
28 In practice 
however, neither of these options proved particularly effective in managing 
catastrophe risk. Most insurance companies  were geographically 
diversified already, and attempts to reduce catastrophe risk by increasing 
premiums or reducing coverage in catastrophe-prone states are constrained 
by legislation.
29  
Insurers receive a price on the futures index equal to the present 
discounted value of their position minus a risk premium, as they are 
essentially purchasing protection from the risk inherent in their business. 
Investors, in turn, bear the risk, and are compensated by the risk premium 
discounted by insurers.
30 Individuals and institutions seeking asset 
                                                 
26.  James W. Kolari, Donald R. Fraser and Ali Anari,  The Effects of 
Securitization on Mortgage Market Yields: A Cointegration Analysis, 26  REAL 
ESTATE ECON. 677 (Winter 1998). 
27.  Sara Borden and Asani Sarkar, Securitizing Property Catastrophe Risk, 
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. at 5 (Aug. 1996). 
28.  Id. at 1. 
29.  Id. at 2. 
30.  Knut K. Aase and Bert Arne Odegaard,  Empirical Tests of Models of 
Catastrophe Insurance Futures, Wharton Financial Institutions Working Paper 
Series No. 96-18, 2-3 (1996).      
 




diversification receive additional compensation from catastrophe insurance 
options by virtue of the fact that catastrophe losses are not correlated with 
either the stock or bond markets.
31 
The securitization of catastrophic risk insurance generated other 
benefits as well. Professors Knut Aase and Bert Odegaard of the 
Norwegian School of Economics observe that securitization has provided 
improved standardization and liquidity, as well as a substantial reduction in 
credit risk.
32 They point out that “unlike reinsurance, hedging through 
futures has the advantage of reversibility since any position may be closed 
before the maturity of the contract.”
33 Before securitization it was difficult 
and costly to scale back on reinsurance. This illiquidity forced insurance 
carriers to either purchase a less-than-optimal quantity of reinsurance, or 
risk paying for reinsurance that was no longer necessary. Securitization 
eliminated the latter risk, and thus made it possible for firms to purchase 
optimal levels of hedges. Professors Aase and Odegaard conclude that an 
insurer may effectively trade off between risk coverage and upside 
potential by using the efficient secondary market in catastrophic risk 
insurance.
34 
The securitization of an asset can be thought of as an enhancement of 
an existent secondary market. Before this enhancement in the secondary 
market for catastrophic risk, an insurance company was not able to obtain 
the market value of its positions by purchasing reinsurance, as demand was 
constrained by the secondary market purchasers’ own risk considerations. 
Securitization has mitigated much of this secondary market risk, which has 
prompted an increase in secondary demand. This demand, in turn, has 
improved significantly the liquidity of an insurance company’s positions in 
catastrophic risk policies and increased the valuation  that  insurance 
companies place on their positions in these policies. Thus, the 
enhancement of the secondary market ultimately increased the demand for 
catastrophic risk in the primary market,  and insurers now purchase more 
risk at a higher price. The producers of this risk—catastrophic risk 
policyholders—have benefited as well, as the increased demand of insurers 
has translated into both a greater availability of policies, and lower rates for 
those policies. 
C.  Nasdaq-Listed Securities 
The primary market for a security is the market in which a company 
makes its initial sale of shares, or “initial public offering.” Participation in 
the primary market is usually limited to institutional investors, such as 
                                                 
31.  Gurdip Bakshi and Dilip Madan,  Average-Rate Claims With Emphasis 
On Catastrophe Loss Options, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (2002). 
32.  Aase and Odegaard, supra note 30. 
33.  Id. at 2-3. The authors note that “a traditional reinsurance contract may be 
reversed, however in practice reversing a reinsurance transaction  exposes the 
insurer to relatively high transaction costs presumably to protect the reinsurer 
against adverse selection.” Id. 
34.  Bakshi and Madan, supra note 31.    
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mutual funds, endowments, or pension funds.
35 Institutional investors assist 
underwriters through their various “expressions of interest,” which provide 
an idea of what the market demand for a particular offering will be. These 
investors are typically rewarded for this service by receiving allocations of 
oversubscribed issues.
36 After shares of a company have been sold on the 
primary market, they become available for purchase and resale almost 
immediately on a secondary market.
37 
As was the case in our prior example, the advent of a secondary market 
innovation enhanced the functions of a market that had existed for some 
time. In this instance, electronic communications networks (ECNs) 
enhanced the secondary market for Nasdaq securities. Beginning in the mid 
1990s, ECNs developed electronic order matching as a means of executing 
over-the-counter trades more efficiently than  by manually searching the 
screen-based quotations of brokers and market makers.  
ECNs use algorithmic innovations to process their customers’ 
transactions quickly and efficiently.
38  ECNs  began by providing market 
makers with the ability to quote prices in increments finer than the 
minimum quotation increment, and to access one another electronically. 
Those features were not readily available through Nasdaq’s own trading 
systems.
39 In addition to informational advantages, ECNs offer markedly 
faster order execution than do traditional exchanges, executing orders an 
average of seven to ten times faster than traditional exchanges.
40 ECNs also 
offer pre-trade and post-trade anonymity to traders, a particularly important 
offering for institutional investors because it helps protect them from the 
potential front running of traders and “piggyback trading” of uninformed 
investors.
41  
Monopolists are naturally l ess inclined to innovate than are 
competitive firms. Not surprisingly, competition  amongst ECNs, and 
between ECNs and Nasdaq, has been credited with much of the innovation 
in the order matching business over the past decade. In a June 2000 study 
                                                 
35.  PBS Frontline: An IPO Primer (visited Aug. 30, 2002) 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/thinking/primer.html>. 
36.  Id. 
37.  A stock will begin trading on a particular predetermined secondary 
market after its initial public offering in the primary market. A secondary market 
is organized either as an exchange, where transactions are made in a physical 
location (such as the New York Stock Exchange or American Exchange), or an 
over-the-counter market where buyers and sellers are decentralized and use a 
mechanism such as a computer network to conduct trades (such as the NASDAQ). 
See  MARK  GRINBATT  &  SHERIDAN  TITMAN,  FINANCIAL  MARKETS AND 
CORPORATE STRATEGY 81 (Irwin-McGraw-Hill 1998). 
38.  For the remainder of this paper, we use the term “order matching” to refer 
to algorithmic electronic order matching. 
39.  DEPARTMENT OF  ECONOMIC  RESEARCH,  NASD,  THE  NASDAQ  STOCK 
MARKET:  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND  &  CURRENT  OPERATION 31, (NASD 
Working Paper 98-01, Aug. 24, 1998).  
40.  James McAndrews and Chris Stefanadis,  The Emergence of Electronic 
Communication Networks in the U.S. Equity Markets, 6 FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. 
3 (2000). 
41.  Id.      
 




by the Division of Market Regulation, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission recognized the competitive importance of ECNs: 
Alternative trading systems, known as ECNs, have become integral to 
the modern securities markets, providing investors with enhanced 
flexibility and reduced trading costs, as well as competition to the 
established securities exchanges and the Nasdaq stock market.
42 
ECNs were able to pioneer these innovations because, as outside firms, 
they stood to profit from their contributions. Whereas a monopolist’s profit 
from innovation may be hampered by cannibalization of its existing 
offerings, a competitive firm is, for the most part, unencumbered by such 
considerations. Because they were not already earning revenue from the 
majority of Nasdaq traders, E CNs stood to earn returns not only from 
customers’ increased willingness to pay, but also from the customers they 
induced to switch over to their service. 
The order matching innovations introduced by ECNs are credited with 
significantly narrowing bid-ask s preads for Nasdaq-listed securities and 
spurring investment in automated trading systems. ECNs have significantly 
lowered fees and transaction costs for institutional investors. According to 
Business Week, “ECNs have revolutionized trading by bringing down 
[transaction] costs from as much as 7 cents a share to as little as a half-cent 
and by helping to reduce bid-ask spreads.”
43 An October 2000 study by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that, in addition to lowering 
transaction costs, ECNs have contributed to a decline in the bid-ask spread 
on Nasdaq by more than 40 percent since 1997.
44 Professor James P. 
Weston of Rice University conducted both regression and matched-sample 
analyses of the effects of ECN activity on liquidity, and he concluded that 
ECNs create an overall improvement in the liquidity of Nasdaq.
45 
According to Professor Weston, ECNs “lower spreads, increase depth, and 
decrease market concentration.”
46 
The more liquid a given security’s secondary market, the more 
valuable the stock is to  investors in the primary market. Thus, the 
enhancements in the Nasdaq-listed secondary market for securities brought 
about by ECNs benefit not only customers in the secondary market, but 
also institutional investors in the primary market of initial public offerings.  
                                                 
42.  Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission,  Special Study: Electronic Communications Networks and After-
Hours Trading (released June 2000). 
43.  Pallavi Gogoi, Behind Nasdaq’s Hissy Fit, BUS. WEEK at 105 (Mar. 5, 
2001). 
44.  McAndrews and Stefanadis,  supra note  40, at 2-3  (“In the absence of 
direct competition from public limit orders, dealers could potentially post lower 
bid or higher offer prices for stocks, earning excess profits at the expense of 
investors.”). 
45.  James P. Weston, 22  Electronics Communications Networks and 
Liquidity on the Nasdaq, J. FIN. SERVICES RESEARCH 125 (forthcoming). 
46.  Id.    
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D.  Analogues to the Life Insurance Industry 
The examples examined above provide useful examples of the benefits 
of a robust secondary market in the life insurance industry. The emergence 
of a secondary market for home mortgages, and their subsequent 
securitization,  has  increased the liquidity of the underlying asset to 
mortgage lenders and reduced the credit risk associated with the purchase 
of the asset in the primary market. The emergence of viatical and life 
settlement firms, by the same process, has led to an increase in the liquidity 
of life insurance policies. Furthermore, this liquidity has fostered a decline 
in a credit risk, of sorts, for consumers in the primary market. A consumer 
now knows that if he should experience a decline in life expectancy and no 
longer need (or no longer be able to afford) his life insurance policy, he 
will be able to sell it for its market value instead of having to surrender it 
for the low price offered by the insurance carrier. The secondary market for 
home m ortgages caused mortgage lenders to value mortgage payments 
more highly, and to demand a higher quantity of these payments. By the 
same process, the modern secondary market for life insurance has caused 
consumers to value life insurance policies more highly,  which has 
positively affected the demand for life insurance in the primary market. 
In the case of catastrophe risk, the enhancement to the secondary 
market brought about by securitization allowed insurance companies—the 
purchasers of catastrophe risk liability in the primary market—to more 
easily retreat from (or hedge) risk liability. Just as the secondary market for 
catastrophic risk insurance mitigates much of the downside risk from the 
original acquisition of a risk liability, the secondary market for life 
insurance mitigates the downside risk from the purchase of a life insurance 
policy on the primary market. A consumer knows that should he need or 
desire to sell his policy in the future, he will not have to accept an amount 
less than the market price. This mitigation of downside risk led insurance 
companies to purchase more catastrophic risk liability in the primary 
market, and it should likewise be expected to cause consumers in the 
primary market for life insurance to demand a greater quantity of coverage. 
Investors in the secondary market for securities are similar to investors 
in the secondary market for life insurance policies in that they are pursuing 
attractive financial returns. The ECNs are similar to the life settlement 
companies in that their innovation increased the liquidity and market depth 
of the secondary market. This increased liquidity in the secondary market 
for securities benefits institutional investors who purchase shares in a 
company in the primary securities market, just as it benefits purchasers of 
life insurance policies. 
 
III. THE BENEFITS OF THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
POLICIES 
With a whole-life policy, earlier premiums are greater than necessary 
to compensate for the low death risk in the early years. As a result,  a 
whole-life insurance policy  builds up a surplus from which future      
 




premiums can be subsidized.
47 If we assume that policies are priced in an 
actuarially fair manner, then for any given policyholder, the value of the 
payment by the insurance company to the policyholder’s beneficiaries is 
projected to precisely equal the total expected value of the premium 
payments made by the policyholder.
48 
But what if a policyholder’s preferences change and he no longer 
needs the policy he has purchased? The policyholder would naturally wish 
to receive payment for the val ue that has built up in the policy by virtue of 
his surplus payments. Indeed, if it was not possible to cash out of a policy 
that was no longer needed, uncertainty about future insurance preferences 
would decrease the value of whole-life insurance to consumers. Life 
insurance carriers recognize this, so whole-life policies include an option 
for the policyholder to resell, or “surrender,” a policy to the issuing insurer 
in return for a cash sum. 
Surrender values can be thought of as secondary market prices for 
policies that are set in the primary market for life insurance. Before the 
entry of viatical and life settlement firms, the life insurance carrier had the 
potential to exercise monopsony power in the secondary market for its own 
life insurance policies. Competition in the primary market, however, 
prevented the incumbent from exercising this power in the repurchase of 
normal policies—that is, policies for which the insured is of normal health. 
Primary market competition did not eliminate this monopsony power for 
impaired policies, and life insurance carriers have historically earned 
economic rents on the surrender of those policies. 
A.  Surrender Values Are Set in the Primary Market under Normal Health 
Conditions 
Surrender values are set in the primary market for life insurance, which 
can be characterized as having a relatively high  degree of competition.
49 
This competition among insurance carriers in the primary market drives 
both the premiums and terms of life i nsurance policies to roughly 
competitive levels, and surrender values are set to roughly correspond to 
the surplus value that builds up in policies over time. Stated differently, the 
“price” that a policyholder receives for the surrender of his whole-life 
policy is roughly the amount by which the payments he has made to the 
insurance company exceed the actuarially fair cost of his insurance.
50 
                                                 
47.  This surplus is also calculated to create an endowment equal to the face 
value of the policy at a maturity age (typically 100). 
48.  In reality the insurance carrier would earn a margin on the policy 
according to the competitiveness of the market, and the final payment would 
include investment returns on the policyholder’s premium payments. 
49.  Although it is by no means a  perfectly competitive market, incumbent 
carriers do not exercise significant market power over policyholders in the primary 
market, as a monopolist or oligopolist might. 
50.  In the case of a term-life policy, a schedule of premiums is set to cover 
the projected mortality risk associated with a policyholder over the life of the    
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Because the actuarially fair rate of insurance is calculated based on the 
assumption of normal health, the pricing of surrender values will constitute 
fair rates given normal health. 
The existence of a surrender value for a policy does not obligate an 
individual who wishes to resell his policy to resell to the issuing insurance 
carrier. Indeed, life insurance policies a re typically assignable, which 
means that a policyholder is free to transfer his ownership of the policy to 
another person. A policyholder’s right to assign his policy to someone 
other than the insurance carrier has existed for some time, which means 
that  there  potentially  has been a secondary market for life insurance 
policies for as long as policies have been assignable. In its early stages, this 
market consisted of the issuing life insurance carrier and a handful of 
individual speculators. Although a few policyholders did sell their policies 
to individual speculators, most were unwilling to make such sales because 
there were no safeguards against the financial interest of the speculator in 
the early death of the insured. Thus, for the majority of policyholders, the 
issuing life insurance company was the only viable buyer in the secondary 
market. 
B.  The Monopsony Power of Incumbents over Policyholders Who 
Experience Declines in Health. 
Before the emergence of viatical and life settlement firms, the only 
buyer for a policy in the secondary market was the life insurance company 
that had issued the policy, and in the case of term-life insurance there was 
no buyer at all.
51 Thus, the life insurance company had monopsony power 
over the repurchase of its own policies in the secondary market for life 
insurance. However, because surrender values are set  ex ante in the 
primary market, rather than ex post in the secondary market, competition in 
the primary market prevented the exercise of this monopsony power for 
policyholders with normal health. 
Figure 1 shows how the surplus payments of a whole-life policyholder 
create economic value in the policy over time, and how the surrender value 
tracks this increased value.
52 In this case, the policyholder buys the policy 
at age 40. The buildup of policy value is based on the assumption that the 
policyholder’s health follows a normal pattern as he ages, and the vertical 
distance between the two curves represents the economic margin earned by 
the life insurance carrier on the surrender of a healthy policy, together with 
an allowance for transaction costs. 
                                                                                                                
policy. Because there is no buildup of value in a term policy, the surrender value is 
zero. 
51.  See, e.g.,  Asinof,  supra note  11;  Jack V. Sinclair, AICPA Planner, 1. 
Individual speculators in life insurance policies are ignored because most 
policyholders were not willing to sell to such speculators and because the effect of 
these speculators was insufficient to affect the market power of incumbent life 
insurers. 
52.  We have in mind a whole-life policy but the same mechanism can be 
applied to term life with flat premiums. Also, note that the curve of surrender 
values lies below the curve of the economic value of a healthy policy because of 
the limited nature of competition in the primary market.      
 





FIGURE 1: ECONOMIC VALUES AND SURRENDER VALUE 
 
Now consider a policyholder whose health suddenly deteriorates 
significantly at age  65. Because the policyholder’s life expectancy is 
curtailed, the present actuarial value of the policy will be much higher than 
for a 65-year-old in normal health. Stated differently, the marginal revenue 
that the insurance company receives from the repurchase of an impaired 
policy is substantially greater than the marginal revenue from the 
repurchase of a normal policy. As Figure 1 shows, if the issuing insurance 
company creates a single schedule of surrender values based on a uniform 
assumption of normal health, its surrender terms will be low relative to the 
actual policy value for an individual with impaired health. 
If the insurer is the only repurchaser of its own policies, the 
policyholder cannot bargain effectively over the surrender value—there is 
no other potential buyer for the policy. In these circumstances, the 
policyholder would be forced to either accept an amount that is 
substantially less than the true economic value or elect not to surrender the 
policy. 
If competition in the primary market constrains an insurance carrier’s 
monopsony power over the surrender of a normal policy, then why does 
competition not have the same effect on the surrender of an impaired 
policy? The answer lies in the regulatory constraints faced by life insurance 
carriers. If an insurance carrier wished to increase its market share in the 
primary market for life insurance by offering more competitive surrender 
values for impaired policies, it would have to offer consumers a set of 
health-dependent surrender values. Such an offering of explicit health-
dependent surrender values by a life insurance carrier, however, would be 
fraught with regulatory, actuarial, and administrative difficulties. Life 
insurance carriers do not offer health-adjusted surrender values, which 
suggests that these difficulties outweigh the benefits that carriers would 




Policy Value for 





based on Normal 
Health 
Economic Value 
based on Normal 
Health 
Value of 
Policy    
 
October 2002]  Secondary Life Insurance Markets  19 
 
 
The price that an incumbent life insurance carrier pays for the 
surrender of an impaired policy is significantly lower than the competitive 
rate for such a policy. The price  that a life insurance carrier with 
monopsony power will pay for an impaired policy is just the market price 
for the surrender of a healthy policy. Assume that the incumbent carrier has 
complete freedom in the pricing of impaired policies, ex post. Subject only 
to the constraint that it offers the same surrender value to all similar 
policies, what level would it choose? To clarify the issue, imagine a block 
of identical policies with the same face value, covering individuals with the 
same age and the same level of health impairment. The supply curve in 
Figure 2 shows how many policies will be surrendered to the insurer at any 




FIGURE 2: SUPPLY CURVE OF THE SURRENDER OF IMPAIRED POLICIES 
 
This supply curve is also the average variable cost to the insurer of re-
purchasing the impaired policies because, for any given quantity of policies 
repurchased, it represents the price that the insurance carrier must pay for 
each policy. The marginal cost to the insurer—that is, the change in total 
repurchase costs as a result of repurchasing one more policy—will be 
higher than the average cost as shown by the marginal cost curve.
54 The 
marginal benefit to the insurer from repurchase is the actuarial value of the 
policy (the expected present value of the future claims payment, adjusted 
for future mortality risk) because the insurer benefits by buying out this 
liability. With our assumptions, the actuarial values of policies in the block 
are constant and thus the marginal benefit is simply this actuarial value, as 
depicted by the flat marginal revenue curve.  
Assuming it can offer a surrender price ex post, the incumbent insurer 
will maximize its profits by choosing the quantity,  Q(m), at which 
                                                 
53.  CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 3. 
54.  The marginal cost is higher than the average variable cost because, in 
order to obtain a marginally higher quantity of impaired life insurance, the carrier 
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marginal cost equals marginal revenue for the impaired policy. For this 
quantity Q(m), the supply curve determines the monopsony surrender value 
to be V(m), as depicted by A. The deadweight loss from this choice of 
surrender values is equal to the area of triangle ABC.
55  
If the competitive surrender value for a normal policy is higher than 
V(m), as depicted by  V(h)1, the incumbent carrier will earn a supra-
competitive profit to the extent t hat  V(h)1  is less than  V(c)—the 
competitive rate for the surrender of impaired policies. The incumbent 
insurance carrier will be unable to achieve the monopsony rate for the 
surrender of the impaired policy, however, because it is contractually 
obligated to offer the competitive healthy rate. Nevertheless, the insurance 
carrier earns a supracompetitive rent on the surrender of impaired policies 
equal to the diagonally-shaded rectangle, and produces a deadweight loss 
equal to the area shaded in solid.
56 
However, if there were a competitive secondary market on which these 
policies could be re-sold, the incumbent insurer would lose its ability to set 
the price in the market.
57 The surrender value would rise to its competitive 
level, V(c), with a higher number of policies,  Q(c), being resold. The 
solidly-shaded triangle shows the efficiency loss from allowing the 
incumbent insurer to hold monopsony power in the repurchase of its 
impaired policies. This efficiency loss corresponds to the deadweight loss 
created by a  monopoly seller, and is the loss in real income of 
policyholders that arises because of the reduction in output caused by 
monopsony power. If there is no external market for the resale of policies, 
insurers have no incentive to adjust their surrender values to fair levels 
because they reap supra-competitive profits from the current system and 
would have to forgo these profits in a competitive environment. 
C.  The Effects of Surrenders on Incumbents’ Costs  
The surrender of a policy by different policyholders of differing health 
affects the incumbent carrier’s costs differently, and the carrier must 
account for the costs of these surrenders. The health of a policyholder who 
surrenders a policy affects the costs of insurance carriers because it 
determines the discounted net death-benefit liability from which the carrier 
is relieved.
58 Furthermore, the health of a policyholder affects the 
                                                 
55.  For a discussion of deadweight loss, see  PAUL  A.  SAMUELSON  & 
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (Irwin McGraw, 16th ed. 1998). 
56.  If the competitive surrender value for a normal policy is lower than  V(m), 
as depicted by V(h)2, there are certain financial mechanisms that the incumbent 
insurance carrier can use to effectively raise its surrender value for the impaired 
policy to the monopsony rate. 
57.  This follows from the economic principle that a monopolist loses its 
price-setting ability with the entry of competition. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL 
& ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 272 (Dryden Press, 6th 
ed. 1994). 
58.  This discounted net death benefit liability is the amount by which the net 
present value of the death benefit liability from which the insurance carrier is    
 
October 2002]  Secondary Life Insurance Markets  21 
 
 
likelihood that that policyholder will surrender his policy, which magnifies 
or mitigates the effects of surrenders by members of a given health profile. 
If surrender values set at the time of issue are based on the assumption 
of normal health at surrender and are actuarially fair (competitive), any 
surrender of a policy by an individual with normal health will not affect the 
insurance carrier’s costs. The amount that the insurance company pays to 
the individual for the surrender of his policy will equal the corresponding 
discounted net death benefit liability from which the carrier is relieved 
(with an adjustment for the insured’s transaction costs). Stated differently, 
the surrender of a policy by a healthy individual simply causes the 
insurance carrier to exchange two equal costs. 
An individual with  above-average health is expected to live longer 
than an individual with normal h ealth, so the ultimate payout by the 
insurance carrier is further out on the horizon. The carrier’s discounted net 
death benefit liability for an individual with above-average health is thus 
less than for an individual with normal health. This means that t he 
surrender of a policy by an individual with above-average health reduces 
the incumbent carrier’s discounted net death benefit liability by less than 
the cost of repurchasing the policy and is thus a losing proposition for the 
insurance company. 
An individual with impaired health, on the other hand, is expected to 
have a shorter life than an individual with normal health, so the carrier’s 
discounted net death benefit liability is greater than for an individual with 
normal health. Thus, the surrender of an impaired policy decreases the 
incumbent carrier’s discounted net death benefit liability by more than the 
cost of repurchasing the policy. Surrenders of impaired policies actually 
decrease the expected costs to incumbent insurance carriers of issuing a 
policy.  
Health status does not merely affect the cost of a given surrender to an 
insurance carrier. It also plays a large part in a consumer’s decision to 
surrender a policy. If an individual’s health is above-average, then that 
individual’s life insurance is no longer a good value because he is paying 
premiums based on the average level of mortality risk—a figure which is 
higher than his actual mortality risk. Because such an individual’s positive 
shift in life expectancy decreases the value he attaches to his policy, he will 
thus be more likely to surrender his policy than an individual with normal 
health. This propensity of policyholders to surrender their policies when 
their life expectancy exceeds the average is known as adverse selection, 
and is costly to incumbent insurers because it means that the average life 
expectancy for the remaining pool of policyholders is lower than projected 
at the time the policies were issued.
59  
If an individual’s health is below average, then he is less likely to 
surrender his policy because an impaired policy is worth more than a 
normal policy. On the other hand, a negative shift in life expectancy 
changes the consumption preferences of many individuals (in favor of 
                                                                                                                
relieved exceeds the net present value of the expected future stream of premium 
payments from the policyholder.  
59.  For a more thorough examination of the adverse selection phenomenon, 
see G. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons, 84 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 488 (1970).      
 




current consumption), particularly if the motivating factors for the life 
insurance policy are no longer relevant.
60 For example, many AIDS victims 
found it difficult to pay premiums and needed immediate money to pay 
medical bills to maintain their quality of life in their few remaining years.
61 
An individual whose consumption preferences have changed in favor of 
current consumption values cash more highly at the current time, and thus 
is willing to accept a lower price for his policy’s surrender than he would 
have when his health was normal. Thus, absent entry by third parties into 
the secondary market, insurance carriers are able to reap significant gains 
by underpaying for the surrender of these impaired policies. 
Because entrants into the secondary market—both viatical and life 
settlement firms—are only interested in acquiring policies of individuals 
with impaired health, entry into the secondary market will systematically 
reduce the number and value of impaired policies that are surrendered to 
the incumbent carrier for less than the competitive rate. At the same time, 
viatical and life settlement firms do not affect the number of individuals 
with average or above-average health who surrender their policies to the 
incumbent carrier. It is obvious that, by lowering the number of cost-
reducing surrenders to the incumbent without causing any corresponding 
reduction in the number of cost-increasing surrenders, entrants into the 
secondary market for life insurance policies cause net increases in 
incumbents’ costs. 
The fact that incumbents’ costs have risen because of entry by viatical 
and life settlement firms, however, is not sufficient to demonstrate that 
consumers in the primary market are made worse off by such entry, as the 
incumbent carriers allege. For one thing, the increased costs to insurance 
carriers  cannot be  passed on, wholesale, to consumers in the primary 
market. The degree to which any cost increase is passed on to consumers is 
dependent on the elasticity of demand for life insurance in the primary 
market—the more elastic the demand, the less of the cost increase the 
incumbent insurers will be able to impose on consumers.
62 Indeed, our 
analysis in the following section demonstrates that consumers in the 
primary market for life insurance are made better off, on net, from the 
development of a robust secondary market for life insurance policies. 
                                                 
60.  The concept of health-state dependent preferences has been explored in 
numerous economic articles, including one written by one of this paper’s authors. 
See Neil Doherty and Harris Schlesinger, Viaticals: A Matter of Life and Death, 
Working Paper for Presentation to the European Group of Risk and Insurance 
Economists 10 (Sept. 2000). 
61.  As noted earlier in this paper, the need of these policyholders was 
instrumental in the development of the viatical market. More recently, this market 
for settlement has grown to include other health- and age-related  lapses and 
surrenders. Although not as dramatic as the AIDS case, these other health 
impairments also create shifts in the consumption preferences of policyholders. 
62.  This is the same principle that applies to tax burden analysis. See, e.g., 
BAUMOL  &  BLINDER,  supra note  57, at 241-42,  see generally,  EDGAR  K. 
BROWNING  & WILLIAM  R.  JOHNSON,  THE  DISTRIBUTION OF THE  TAX  BURDEN 
(American Enterprise Institute, 1979).    
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Insurance companies claim that as a result of this change in the 
marketplace, they would be forced to increase the insurance premiums that 
they charge policyholders. Furthermore, the insurance industry contends 
that, in the case of term life insurance, there is so much competition that 
some firms would become insolvent if they were forced to absorb the 
additional costs imposed on them by a secondary market. 
The only “costs” imposed on an incumbent carrier by firms in the 
secondary market for life insurance policies, however, are the costs 
associated with the incumbent’s continued honoring  of the terms of its 
original policy—that is, the costs that the incumbent should reasonably 
have expected to pay in the absence of profitable lapses. If the incumbent 
carrier accurately accounts for these costs in the pricing of a given policy, 
secondary sales of policies will not cause the carrier to lose money on the 
policies. Secondary market transactions, by themselves, can only cause a 
carrier to lose money on its policies if that carrier under-priced the policies 
in anticipation of  high rate of  profitable lapses—a practice known as 
“lapse-supported pricing.” Although incumbents are no longer supposed to 
use lapse-supported pricing,
63 many insurers still have such policies 
outstanding from when the practice was allowable. Some even maintain 
that certain carriers continue to engage in the practice.
64 
In a perfectly competitive market, an increase in cost could lead to 
insolvency among certain firms in the industry.
65 The doomsday projection 
of the incumbents, however, ignores two important points: first, the life 
insurance industry is not perfectly competitive, and second, a robust 
secondary market will increase customers’  valuation of life i nsurance 
policies. Economic theory holds that an active and efficient secondary 
market for a good improves the liquidity of the good as an asset, and thus 
increases the value of the good to consumers. Indeed, this very 
phenomenon was observed in all three  financial service industries 
considered in this paper. Such an increase in the valuation of life insurance 
policies would—other things equal—shift the demand for life insurance 
outward and to the right, which would lead to an increase in premiums for 
life insurance. 
                                                 
63.  It has been shown that lapse-supported pricing can foster a perverse 
relationship between the insurance company and policyholder  by creating  a 
situation in which the insurance company would benefit if  all policyholders 
dropped their policies. Because the insurance company can adjust its pricing after 
the fact in such a situation, it is the policyholder that bears the lapse risk for a 
lapse-supported policy—a clear reversal of roles.  See Glenn S. Daily,  Lapse-
Supported Pricing: Is It Worth the Risks?, GLENNDAILY.COM INFO. SERV. (Sept. 
19, 2002). 
64.  See Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World: Back to the Future When 
Life Insurance Was Fun, WALL. ST. J. at A23 (Mar. 14, 2001). 
65.  Indeed, as William J. Baumol of NYU and Alan S. Blinder of Princeton 
University explain about the analogous situation of why a perfectly competitive 
industry objects to a tax increase: “[b]ecause, with a negatively sloped demand 
curve, a tax will cut into sales, cause short-term losses, and force some firms out 
of the industry. That is not a pleasant prospect for incumbent firms.” BAUMOL & 
BLINDER, supra note 57, at 242.      
 




D.  Benefits to Policyholders from an Active Secondary Market  
A secondary market for life insurance policies erodes the ability of 
insurance companies to extract monopsony rent from  policy terminations 
policyholders who have experienced a decline in health. An insurance 
company is forced to either compensate a policyholder for the surrender of 
his policy according to the market value of that policy, or face the prospect 
of the policyholder selling his policy to a third party (such as life 
settlement firm), in which case the insurance company’s liability deriving 
from the policy would remain intact. 
Viatical and life settlement firms allow policyholders who have 
experienced a negative shift in life expectancy to obtain the fair market 
value for their life insurance assets. Although it does not make sense for 
most policyholders to surrender their policies at the market value,
66 the 
flexibility offered by the secondary market for life insurance policies gives 
a policyholder the ability to respond to changes in his life situation.  
There are a variety of situations in which the sale of a policy by an 
eligible individual to a viatical or life settlement firm is welfare improving: 
 
• The premiums on the policy are no longer affordable. 
• The beneficiary for whom the policy was original purchased is now 
deceased or no longer has a need for the policy. 
• A key-man policy, designed to protect a company from the financial 
loss of a key executive, is no longer necessary, either because the 
business has folded or the individual is no longer integral to the 
business’s success. 
• The policyholder owns multiple life insurance policies and wishes to 
eliminate one. 
• The policyholder wishes to replace an individual policy with a 
survivorship policy, a long term care insurance policy, or funds for 
long term care. 
• The policyholder requires funds to pay for medical expenses or for 
new and experimental treatments for himself or someone close to 
him. 
• The sale of the policy would allow the policyholder to maintain a 
desired standard of living and live out his final years with dignity.  
• The policyholder wishes to remove the policy from a trust or estate. 
• A reduction in the value of the policyholder’s estate reduces the tax 
liability which the life insurance policy was designed to provide for 
• An increase in the liquidity of the policyholder’s estate eliminates 
the need for the policy. 
                                                 
66.  Alan Buerger, co-founder and CEO of Coventry First LLC, a leading life 
settlement firm cautions that most people “shouldn’t be selling their policy if they 
have the means to keep it.” However, as Mr. Buerger explains, “the reality is that 
people drop insurance every day.” Asinof, supra note 11.    
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• The policyholder wishes to donate highly appreciated assets to 




The many examples listed above detail situations in which a 
policyholder might wish to sell his life insurance policy. Although it 
has always been possible for a policyholder to sell his policy to the 
incumbent life insurance company, in cases where the policyholder had 
experienced a decline in health, the underpayment by the insurance 
company restricted the policyholder’s ability to meet the above goals. 
The secondary market for life insurance policies gives the policyholder 
the economic freedom to choose between a number of buyers and, in 
so doing, to receive the fair market price of his policy.
68 
1.  Theoretical Analysis 
As in any market, the quantity of insurance sold in the primary market 
is determined by the price. Higher prices induce more supply and less 
demand and lower prices enhance demand but depress supply. The market 
reaches equilibrium at  the price that equates supply with demand. For 
insurance, the “price” is a little subtle and needs some explanation. 
The premiums paid by a policyholder for a life insurance policy with a 
particular face value might intuitively appear to be the appropriate measure 
of price. Premiums, however, prove deficient as a price measure because in 
insurance markets, most of the premiums are returned to the policyholder 
in the form of claims payments or surrenders. Economists and industry 
analysts thus uniformly view the price of insurance as the spread between 
the premium paid and the amount that insured expects to have returned on 
average in claims and surrenders.
69 
The spread is the amount paid to the insurer for the service of 
transferring risk. Almost all empirical studies of insurance markets use the 
spread as the appropriate price that equates supply and demand.
70 The 
                                                 
67.  Sinclair,  supra note  51, at 2 -3; Kaja Whitehouse,  Getting Personal: 
Viaticals Mature, But Risks Remain, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 14, 2002) 
(citing Martin Nissenbaum, national director of retirement planning at Ernst & 
Young, LLP). 
68.  As Erich W. Sippel of Erich Sippel & Co. and Alan H. Buerger of 
Coventry First LLC point out, “[a]t bottom, the case for the secondary market in 
life insurance policies is pro-freedom and pro-consumer.  The existence of a 
secondary market eliminates the situation in which policyholders have 
traditionally found themselves in disposing of an unneeded life policy: being able 
to sell to only one buyer (the company that issued the policy) at a price set by the 
buyer. That restriction on freedom doesn’t apply to the sale of any other asset.” 
Erich W. Sippel and Alan H. Buerger, Viatical Response, CONTINGENCIES at 6-8 
(Aug. 2002). 
69.  See, e.g., Erich W. Sippel, The Heart at War With the Pocketbook: Life 
Insurance Distribution and Financial Intermediation, 10-12 TOWERS PERRIN.  
70.  See, e.g., David F. Babbel, The Price Elasticity of Demand for Whole Life 
Insurance, 40 J. FINANCE 225 (1985).      
 




following ratio represents the typical method of measuring this spread for a 
particular life insurance product: 
 
Spread = (P – C – S)  / (C + S) 
 
where P  represents the total expected premium payments made for the 
product, C is the expected claims payouts, and S is the expected payments 
made for surrenders (net of surrender charges).
71 
An insurer will increase its supply of insurance in the primary market 
if by doing so it can generate returns that, when adjusted for risk, exceed 
its cost of capital. These returns do not depend on the dollar value of the 
premiums but on the markup over costs accruing to the insurer when 
selling its policies; the higher this markup or spread, the higher the return 
on capital. Thus, other things being equal, the supply of insurance will 
increase as the spread increases. 
Similarly, the dollar value of premiums is not the main determinant of 
insurance demand; it is the markup or loading to the insurer that 
determines whether consumers will transfer their risk to the insurer. But 
this does not mean that the price spread is the only factor to affect the 
demand for insurance. The quality of the product is also an important 
determinant of demand. Following the arguments made earlier in this 
paper,  the enhanced liquidity of insurance provided by viatical and life 
settlement firms  gives rise  to a more flexible policy.  This flexibility 
permits the policyholders to manage not only the risk of death, but also the 
financial consequences of impaired health.   
With these concepts of supply, demand, and economic price in mind, 
we can now compare the incumbent insurer’s anti-competitive hypothesis 
concerning the entry of viaticals and life settlement firms with the pro-
competitive model. If we assume that the creation of the secondary market 
has reduced monopsony rent, and if insurers engaged in “lapse supported 
pricing,” then the dollar premium for primary insurance would increase as 
the insurers contend. However, secondary-market entry would not decrease 
competition in the primary market—that is, entry would not increase the 
spread between the premiums and the insurers’ payouts from claims and 
surrenders. If the premiums, claims, and surrenders before entry were P1, 
C1 and S1, and the comparable values after entry were P2, C2 and S2, then 
the spreads before and after would be:  
 




                                                 
71.  All variables in the above  formula represent net present values. The 
formula represents a simplification to focus on the issues at hand.  A few of the 
subtleties affecting life insurance pricing, such as investment income earned by the 
insurer, are ignored. These omissions do not materially affect the analysis of life 
insurance spread undertaken in this paper. 
72.  One can see this simply by increasing the values P1, C1 and S1 each by the 
same constant percentage.     
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Thus, we should not expect entry to have a material effect on either supply 
or demand in the primary market. The volume of primary insurance would 
change little and any increase in dollar premiums would be matched by an 
increase in surrender or settlements to policyholders. If we consider only 
the spread, the overall effect on consumers is neutral. The economic spread 
is unchanged because consumers were buying an inferior product at a 
lower premium, and are now buying a more liquid—and hence, superior—
product at a corresponding higher premium. 
Considering only the spread, however, ignores the effect of the reduced 
riskiness of the product on insurance demand. Enhanced liquidity brought 
about by  the secondary market makes  life insurance a superior risk 
management product that enables the policyholder to more effectively 
protect himself from the financial effects of death or health impairment. 
Stated differently, entry into the secondary market eliminates the downside 
risk  of receiving less than the market value for the policy if the 
policyholder experiences a decline in health.  
At any price spread consumers will demand more of a product whose 
payouts are less risky. Thus the demand curve will shift outward, as shown 
in Figure 3.
73 The demand before entry is represented by the curve 
“Demand 1” and the supply is denoted by the curve “Supply 1.” The 
market price or spread is therefore “Spread 1” and the quantity is Q1. The 
entry of viaticals and life settlement firms does not affect the spread. The 
market price “Spread 2” will be the same as “Spread 1” and the quantity 
will also remain unchanged at Q2. However, the improvement in product 
quality will increase demand to “Demand 2”. In the short run, entry will 
cause excess demand and increase the price to “Spread 3” with a higher 
quantity, Q3. In the long run, the higher margin will attract new capital into 
the primary insurance industry and thereby increase supply to “Supply 2”. 
This higher margin will restore the spread to its previous level “Spread 2” 
and the volume of insurance will increase further to  Q4. Thus, the 
cumulative effect of entry into the secondary market for life insurance is a 
larger but equally competitive primary industry. 
 
                                                 
73.  By this, we do not mean to imply that the total demand for life insurance 
will necessarily increase. Indeed, the demand for life insurance has been declining 
for the last decade because of lifestyle, cultural, and demographic conditions, and 
because individuals have been increasingly willing to use mutual funds to 
accomplish goals which had previously been met primarily through the purchase 
of life insurance. See ERICH W. SIPPEL, LIFE INSURANCE 1990-2010: FINANCIAL 
INDUSTRIES TO INFORMATION SERVICES AND E-BUSINESS 9 -10 (Erich Sippel & 
Co., 2000). Rather, we demonstrate that demand will increase relative to what it 
would have been absent a secondary market. Thus, although it is entirely possible 
that the total demand for life insurance will continue to decline, the total demand 
will still be higher than it would have been without a secondary market for life 
insurance policies.      
 




FIGURE 3: CONSUMER WELFARE ANALYSIS 
 
The consumer benefit from entry into the secondary market can be 
measured by comparing the “consumer surplus” before and after entry 
occurs—that is, the area under the demand curve bounded at the bottom by 
the spread. Before entry, the consumer surplus is the triangle ABC. In the 
short run, entry increases demand, thereby increasing consumer surplus to 
EFG. Even at the temporary higher spreads, consumers are better off with 
entry in the secondary market because the product is much improved. In 
the long run, as the higher spreads induce additional insurance capacity, 
the spread decreases and consumer surplus rises even more to the triangle 
EBH. The improvement in product quality, together with competitive 
pricing, provides a clear benefit to consumers.  
2.  Empirical Analysis 
As explained above, entry by viatical and life settlement firms should 
improve the welfare of policyholders.  One measure of this improvement in 
welfare is the difference between  a policy’s surrender value and t he 
amount by which the policyholder was compensated by a life settlement 
firm, summed across all policyholders who exercised their option to sell 
their policies in the secondary market. Table 2 estimates the welfare gains 













   Spread 1  
=  Spread 2 
A 
B 
G  F 
E 
C  H    
 
October 2002]  Secondary Life Insurance Markets  29 
 
 
TABLE 2: ANNUAL CONSUMER WELFARE GAINS  
FROM THE USE OF LIFE SETTLEMENTS (IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
  Coventry First  All Life Settlement 
Firms 
  Jan. – Aug. 2002  2002 Projected Total  2002 Projected Total 
Policies  352  528   1,584* 
Total Surrender Value  $20.8  $31.1  $93.4 
Total Offer to 
Policyholders 
$79.1  $118.6     $336.3** 
Total Policyholder 
Surplus 
$58.3  $87.4   $242.9 
Note: * Coventry First estimates that its transactions represent roughly one-third of total life 
settlements. ** This number represents a lower average offer for the industry relative to 
Coventry First (3.6 times the surrender value as opposed to 3.8 times the surrender value). 
This adjustment was made for purposes of conservatism because the offers made by 
Coventry First tend to be a few percentage points higher than those of its competitors. 
Source: Coventry First internal customer data (on file with authors). 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, life settlement firms improved policyholder 
welfare by over $240 million in 2002. This number vastly understates the 
true positive effect of the secondary market on policyholders, however, 
because it does not account for the welfare gains generated by viatical 
firms. Second, our estimate does not incorporate the welfare gains of 
policyholders  from the unexercised option to  sell their policies in the 
future. Unfortunately, this valuable option is difficult to measure.
74 
E.  Other Beneficiaries from an Active Secondary Market 
An active secondary market for life insurance policies creates positive 
externalities for groups other than consumers. Although these externalities 
do not shift the proper focus of the secondary market from the consumer, 
they are worthy of consideration. 
 
1.  Benefits to Insurance Agents 
Consumers do not  typically  deal directly with life insurance 
companies. Rather, they purchase life insurance from agents, who are often 
affiliated with  particular life insurance companies. The economic well-
being of insurance agents is directly tied to their ability to p rovide their 
clients with the insurance advice and policies that best fit their clients’ 
needs. By facilitating the sale of his client’s policy to the life settlement 
firm, the agent can earn additional income. 
There are several ways in which an insurance agent could potentially 
earn income from a life settlement. An agent could earn a commission for 
facilitating the life settlement transaction and from additional life insurance 
sales that were made possible by funds from the sale of the original policy. 
Additionally, an agent could continue to receive the renewal commissions 
                                                 
74.  Finally, we do not account from the welfare gains of policyholders who 
have exercised Accelerated Death Benefit (ADB) options. Gains from ADBs 
should be counted in a calculation of the total policyholder benefits from 
secondary market entry because ADBs were issued as a response to entry by 
viatical and life settlement firms.      
 




on a policy which would otherwise have been terminated (if the policy was 
sold by that agent).
75 Finally, because an active secondary market 
indirectly raises the demand for insurance in the primary market, insurance 
agents as a group benefit from entry into the secondary market. 
2.  Benefits to Incumbent Insurance Carriers 
Although life insurers will lose monopsony power and therefore lose 
economic rent from the termination of policies, the life insurance industry 
would benefit  in the long term  from the stronger demand created by the 
secondary market.  Furthermore, by  standing as ready purchasers of 
policies, firms in the secondary market could discourage the repeal of 
nonforfeiture laws and keep incumbent insurers from the unfair, and 
ultimately unworkable, practice of using high lapse expectations to under-
price certain policies.
76 
By analogy, it is useful to consider the case of the motion picture 
industry. Movie producers vehemently opposed the advent of VCRs 
because they felt that the devices created a cheaper secondary market for 
their films and would hurt their theater receipts. Ultimately, however, 
theater receipts did not decline, and the motion picture industry profited 
handsomely from the new source of demand created by the secondary 
market. 
Securitization of life settlement portfolios would create financial 
instruments whose payoffs are correlated to mortality risk. By taking 
positions in such instruments, an incumbent insurer could hedge its pre-
existing mortality risk. Whereas some reinsurers resisted the introduction 
of these instruments in the catastrophe insurance market, others have 
initiated securitizations as a way of hedging their risk and thereby 
expanding their capacity to offer more reinsurance.
77   
 
 
IV. THE RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR OF INCUMBENT LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANIES 
An incumbent life insurance carrier earns a substantial portion of its 
margins from surrenders by policyholders with diminished life 
expectancies, and is thus interested in protecting those margins. The 
carriers’ purported anti-competitive justifications for curtailing the 
secondary market for life insurance are contradicted by economic theory, 
evidence about the benefits of secondary markets from other industries, 
and empirical evidence from the life insurance industry, itself. The 
                                                 
75.  Coventry First, How to Turn a Lapse or Surrender into Five Sources of 
Income <<http://www.coventryfirst.com/resource/files/fivesources.pdf>>. 
76.  William C. Koenig and Stephen H. Frankel, Don’t Forfeit Nonforfeiture, 
BEST’S REVIEW (June 2002). 
77.  We do of course recognize that the degree of risk imposed on property 
liability insurers by catastrophes might differ from the degree to which mortality 
risk affects the solvency of life insurers.    
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incumbent carriers’ actions are more likely motivated by what economists 
describe as rent-seeking behavior.
78 The incumbent life insurance carriers 
are attempting to protect the profits derived from their monopsony position 
in the secondary market. 
A.  Life Insurance Companies Compete with Viatical and Life Settlement 
Firms in the Secondary Market for Impaired Life Insurance Policies 
Before the entry by viatical and life settlement firms, the only buyer in 
the secondary market for a given life insurance policy was the insurance 
company that had issued the policy. In the early 1990s, after  entry by 
competitors, life insurance companies developed accelerated death benefits 
(ADBs), which give p olicyholders the option of receiving between 25 
percent to nearly 100 percent of their death benefit while they are still 
living.
79 To qualify for an ADB, a policyholder must have a death benefit 
rider on his policy (although in many cases it is not difficult to add such a 
rider once it is needed) and, depending on the policy, must either have a 
dramatically reduced life expectancy, suffer from one of a number of 
specified medical conditions—often called “dread diseases”—or require 
long-term care.
80 Early on, a large percentage of ADBs were triggered by 
either dread diseases or long-term care, but by 1994 terminal illness was 
the overwhelming condition necessary for the exercise of an ADB.
81 
Although the life expectancy required for the exercise of an ADB varies by 
company, product, and state, twelve months is the most common 
maximum allowed life expectancy: only between two and five percent of 
the ADBs on the market triggered by terminal illness allow a policyholder 
with a life expectancy of greater than one year to accelerate his death 
benefit.
82 
                                                 
78.  See  generally  TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING  SOCIETY (J. 
Buchanan, R. Tollison, and G. Tullock eds., Texas A & M University Press 1980). 
79   FTC Facts for Consumers, Viatical Settlements: A Guide for People with 
Terminal Illnesses, at 2 (May 1998) (visited on Aug. 12, 2002) <www.ftc.gov>. 
ADBs can even be offered in the secondary market because it is possible for a 
whole life policy to be converted to add such features. Thus, ADBs represent one 
of the mechanisms that an incumbent insurance carrier could have used to raise the 
surrender values of impaired policies if this value was lower than the monopsony 
rate, as discussed in footnote 74. See Whitehouse, supra note 67, citing American 
Express certified financial planner, Thomas A. Endersbe. For example, on its 
website, New York Life states: “[i]f your policy does not contain the LBR (living 
benefits rider) option, you can add it to your policy now or when you may need 
it.” New York Life, Viatical Marketing, downloaded  on  Sept. 23, 2002 at 
<http://www.newyorklife.com/NYL2/DisplayOne/0,1237,9247-22-76,00.html>. 
80.  LIMRA  INTERNATIONAL  &  AMERICAN  COUNCIL OF  LIFE  INSURANCE, 
ACCELERATED  DEATH  BENEFITS:  1998, 4 (1999);  see also  Accelerated Death 
Benefit Provisos on the Rise, INSURANCE ACCOUNTING (Apr. 19, 1999). 
81.  Id., at 3. 
82.  Id., at 7. A full 73 percent of the ADBs examined in the LIMRA study 
required a life expectancy of one year or less, and another 21 percent required a 
life expectancy of 6 months or less.  Id.  See also, AFLAC.com: “How to Read 
Your Policy,” downloaded on Sept. 16, 2002 at 
<http://www.aflac.com/policy_services/understand_policy_read.asp>.      
 




ADBs were developed as a competitive reaction to the emergence of 
viatical firms.
83 The number of policies with ADB riders has grown in line 
with the growth of the viatical and life settlement industry, as life 
insurance carriers added them to policies with increasing regularity during 
the mid and late 1990s. According to LIMRA International, approximately 
39.9 million life insurance policies contained ADB provisions in 1998, 
which was more than double the number of ADB p olicies in 1994, and 
more than 35 times the number of ADB policies in 1991.
84 
ADBs have also become cheaper and more easily available over the 
last decade. In 1990, nearly 90 percent of ADBs required additional 
premium payments or cost of insurance.
85 By 1998, however, only thirteen 
percent of policies with a death benefit rider involved a higher premium or 
an otherwise increased cost of insurance,
86 and over half of ADB features 
available on individual policies were automatically offered to eligible 
policyholders by insurance companies.
87  
Analyses of the life insurance industry indicate that viatical settlements 
and ADBs  are close substitutes. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
characterized ADBs as a substitute for viatical settlements in its 1998 
release on the viatical industry: 
 
Many options exist for people with terminal illnesses when financial 
needs are critical. For example, you may consider a loan from someone 
such as the original beneficiary of your life insurance policy. Or, if 
you’ve already ruled o ut less expensive alternatives to raise cash, you 
might sell your life insurance policy through a viatical settlement. Many 
life insurance policies in force nationwide now include an accelerated 
benefits provision.
88 
                                                 
83.  Living Benefits More Popular Add-On,  ADVISOR  TODAY 36 (Aug. 1, 
2000). As this article states, the accelerated death benefit “was conceived more 
than a decade ago largely in response to the creation of viatical settlements.” Id. 
See also, Accelerated Death Benefit Provisos on the Rise, INS. ACCT. (Apr. 19, 
1999) (stating that “[t]he increased trend toward more ADB policies follows the 
growing popularity of the viaticals option for terminally ill policyholders seeking 
funds before death.”)  
84.  LIMRA  INTERNATIONAL,  supra note  80, at 19. At least 245 life 
companies, which held 78 percent of the life insurance in force in the United 
States, offered policies with some form of ADBs in 1998.  Accelerated Death 
Benefit Provisos on the Rise, supra note 83, at 1 (Apr. 19, 1999). 
85.  LIMRA INTERNATIONAL, supra note 80, at 11. 
86.  Id. at 10-11. Of policies with a death benefit rider, 36 percent charge 
nothing—except, in some cases, an administrative fee—and 46 percent charge 
policyholders only if the rider is exercised. Id. For example, New York Life offers 
a “Living Benefits Rider” at no additional cost. The rider can be exercised if the 
insured is terminally ill and has a life expectancy of one year or less, and provides 
roughly 85 percent of the face value of the policy. New York Life, “Viatical 
Marketing,” downloaded from company website (Sept. 23, 2002) at 
<http://www.newyorklife.com/NYL2/DisplayOne/0,1237,9247-22-76,00.html>. 
87.  LIMRA INTERNATIONAL, supra note 80, at 8. 
88.  FTC Facts for Consumers, Viatical Settlements: A Guide for People with 
Terminal Illnesses at 2 (May 1998) (visited on Aug. 12, 2002) <www.ftc.gov>.    
 




Viatical settlements and ADBs also have been considered substitutes by 
financial analysts and industry experts.
89  
ADBs are not close substitutes for life settlements, however, because 
the eligible life expectancies for the two products do not overlap.  Yet 
incumbent life insurance carriers do compete with life settlement firms by 
offering surrender values based on normal health. Although such offers are 
not particularly attractive, the fact that one product competes poorly with 
another does not mean that the two products are not substitutes. Surrender 
values are substitutes for life settlements to a health-impaired individual 
seeking to sell his policy—they are just inferior substitutes. 
By 2001, incumbent carriers began to compete more effectively with 
life settlement firms by lobbying for expanded definitions of “qualifying 
events” that trigger ADBs. If an incumbent carrier is permitted to offer an 
ADB for chronic illness, in addition to terminal illness, that carrier can 
provide a closer substitute to life settlement firms. In September 2002, the 
New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance proposed an amendment 
to expand the circumstances under which an ADB could be exercised to 
include chronic illness. The Department determined that such an expansion 
should “positively affect consumers,” and further predicted that “[i]nsurers 
should benefit since policyholders now have more flexibility in 
accelerating a portion of their life insurance rather than exercising other 
life settlement options.”
90 This explicit reference to life settlement firms by 
the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance demonstrates that 
the Department views insurance carriers and life settlement firms as 
competitors in the secondary market for life insurance. 
B.  The Regulatory Environment Confronting Viatical and Life Settlements 
As of September 2002, viatical and life settlements were governed by a 
patchwork of state and federal regulations. In 1996, the SEC’s bid to 
regulate viaticals under federal securities law was rejected by the D.C. 
Court of Appeals.
91 But even though they were not considered to be 
                                                                                                                
The FTC’s release also mentions that Congress amended the tax code in 1997 to 
carve out exemptions for the receipt of both accelerated death benefits and viatical 
settlements, provided the individual insured by the original policy has a life 
expectancy of less than two years. Id. at 3. This tax action suggests that the United 
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existing in the same product market. 
89.  See, e.g. Carolyn T. Geer, 1996 Money Guide: Cashing in Your Chips, 
FORBES at 208 (June 17, 1996). 
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91.  Securities and Exchange Commission v. Life Partners Inc., 87 F.3d 536 
(D.C. Cir 1996). In February 2002, however, the SEC won a preliminary 
injunction against a brokerage firm for fraudulently selling fractional interests in 
life insurance policies. The SEC was able to win this injunction, its first court 
victory since the Life Partners case, because the firm had offered guaranteed 
repurchase terms, which classified the investment as a security. Todd Mason, SEC 
Bars Fort Worth, Texas, Brokerage Firm's Sale of Policy Shares, FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM (Feb. 27, 2002).      
 




securities under federal law, many states classified viatical settlements as 
securities and regulated their sale to investors as such.
92 In February 2002, 
35 states regulated viatical transactions through their insurance regulatory 
departments, but only 13 of these regulated life settlements.
93 Roughly half 
the states did not have licensing requirements for viatical selling.
94 
The regulatory environment has allowed certain abuses by 
unscrupulous companies. These abuses, however, have tended 
overwhelmingly to involve the fraudulent sale of interests in viaticated 
policies to  individual  investors, or the fraudulent acquisition of new 
policies for resale to unscrupulous or unsophisticated firms in the 
secondary market.
95 In contrast, there have been relatively few instances in 
which policyholders have been the target of fraudulent practices. Indeed, in 
a March 2002 letter to the House Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, NAIC president Terri Vaughan explained that “[i]n reality, 
most settlement frauds now involve the investor side of the transaction, not 
the insurance policyholder side.”
96 
Previous articles have attested to the need for sensible regulation of the 
secondary market,
97 and the top firms in the life settlement and viatical 
industries have been supportive of antifraud laws on the grounds that such 
laws would help to curtail abuses by disreputable firms and inspire public 
confidence in (and demand for) the services of the industry as a whole.  
One example of self-regulation is the Life Settlement Institute, which 
is a non-profit trade group consisting of six of the major institutionally-
                                                 
92.  Carol M. Ostrom, A Warning About Fraud in Death-Benefit Sales ; $1.8 
Million Lost in State, Securities Chief Testifies, SEATTLE TIMES at B1 (Feb. 27, 
2002). 
93.  Written Statement of David M. Lewis, supra note 10, at 66. 
94.  Coolidge, supra note 7. 
95.  The extent of the first—and most common—type of fraud, can  be 
perceived from the following excerpt from the  Washington Post: “Securities 
regulators from 21 states have reported that thousands of investors, many of them 
elderly, have been defrauded of more than $400 million over the past three years, 
according to the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA). 
In one case in Texas, a viatical settlement company sold investors shares in 
nonexistent insurance policies.” Michelle Singletary,  The Color of Money: A 
Foolish (And Ghoulish) Investment, WASH. POST at H1 (Mar. 10, 2002). Although 
there are not reliable estimates of the extent of the second type of fraud, 
allegations that some viatical brokers were encouraging individuals with terminal 
illnesses to fraudulently obtain insurance policies led to a federal investigation in 
2000. Joseph Gerth, Kentucky Pulls Viatical Company’s License, THE COURIER 
JOURNAL at 6C (Sept. 25, 2002).  
96.   Letter from Terri Vaughan, president, NAIC, to Sue Kelly and Luis V. 
Gutierrez, chair and ranking member (respectively), House Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations 2 (Mar. 27, 2002). In the letter, Vaughan criticized 
the Committee’s staff report for its misuse of NAIC data to wrongfully imply that 
policyholders are the chief target of fraud in the secondary market for life 
insurance policies. Id. 
97.  See, e.g., Sippel and Buerger, A Free Market for Life Insurance, supra 
note 6, at 20    
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funded life settlement providers and financers.
98 In 2002, the Life 
Settlement Institute began building an anti-fraud database for companies to 
share information of suspicious or fraudulent activity by policy sellers, 
brokers, doctors, financial advisors, or the insured, themselves.
99 In 
addition to such self-regulation, the Life Settlement Institute has publicly 
advocated a stricter and improved regulatory environment. David M. 
Lewis, president of the Life Settlement Institute, stated in written 
testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, that the Life 
Settlement Institute strongly supported strict regulation by state insurance 
and securities regulators of the viatical and life settlement marketplace,
100 
and supported amending the Federal Securities Act of 1933 so that 
interests in pooled life insurance policies sold to individual investors would 
constitute “securities” under the Act.
101  
Several states have moved to regulate the secondary market for life 
insurance. In January 2001, Ohio enacted a law for the regulation of 
viatical firms modeled after the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioner’s (NAIC’s) Model Viatical Settlement Act. The Journal of 
Insurance Accounting explains the benefits of the law:  
 
The new law expands the definition of viator to include life or senior 
settlements, and requires disclosures at a time no later than the time of the 
application by the provider or broker. In addition, the law provides a 15-
day window for the viator to rescind the contract and protects their 
identity. To combat fraud, the law provides a clear definition of what 
constitutes viatical fraud and requires licensed brokers and providers to 
show a plan to identify and combat fraud.
102 
 
As of February 2002, only 20 states regulated the sale of interests in 
viatical or life settlements to individual investors.
103 
There is a strong trend in the industry towards more sophisticated (and 
larger) investors, which should diminish the opportunities for investor 
fraud.  As Terri Vaughan explains, “ [v]iatical settlements today are 
typically pooled together for sale in larger amounts to more sophisticated 
investors.”
104 As just one such example, in October 2001 Warren Buffet’s 
Berkshire Hathaway arranged to invest up to $400 million in Living 
Benefits Financial Services LLC.
105 The due-diligence performed by such 
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investors will have a policing effect on the industry, as firms must either 
meet the necessary investment criteria of institutional investors, or fail to 
acquire such capital. 
C.  Strategies of Incumbent Life Insurance Carriers to Maintain 
Monopsony Power 
Incumbent insurance carriers have a clear economic motive to 
eliminate viatical and life settlement firms from the secondary market for 
life insurance policies.
106 This motivation explains why life insurance 
carriers have lobbied for regulations on viatical and life settlements that are 
unfavorable to  any secondary market transactions. The incumbents’ 
strategies can be best understood in light of their economic interest in re-
establishing monopsony positions in the secondary market. 
In recent years, many incumbent carriers have begun to take steps to 
curtail the entry of viatical and life settlement firms into the secondary 
market. For example, in Kentucky, new regulations, which were introduced 
by incumbent insurance carriers, mandate that a life insurance agent must 
complete an approved 40 hour viatical “prelicensing classroom course of 
study,” apply for and obtain a separate license from the state, and pay a fee 
of $250  before he is allowed to broker a life settlement with a client for 
whom such a settlement might be the best option.
107 Although sensible 
licensing requirements help to eliminate fraudulent viatical and life 
settlement transactions, licensing requirements such as those passed in 
Kentucky eliminate nearly all viatical and life settlement transactions, and 
their associated benefits. 
In addition to lobbying for regulation, incumbent carriers have 
pressured their agents to shun the viatical industry. For example, in a 
November 2000 letter to its financial advisors, AXA explained that its 
financial professionals were “expressly prohibited from participating in 
any viatical settlement or life settlement activity.”
108 Other large insurers 
have also prohibited their career agents from dealing with viatical or life 
settlement companies or providing such services to policyholders.
109 In 
particular, agents of these companies were prohibited from providing 
viatical or life settlement firms with information about any of the carriers’ 
clients for the purpose of having a client enter into an arrangement with the 
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viatical or life settlement firm. In a compliance alert letter sent in February 
2002, GenAmerica directed it agents to encourage policyholders interested 
in viatical or life settlements to use “product alternatives” such as ADBs.
110 
Agents were further instructed to refer a policyholder to the state insurance 
department if he insists on talking with a viatical or life settlement firm.
111 
Finally, agents of GenAmerica Financial (GAF), NEF, and MetLife have 
been expressly prohibited from providing any assistance (beyond that 
which is legally required) to a client who wishes to assign his company 
contractual death benefits to a life or viatical company.
112 
Principal Life prohibits all career agents (as well as their employees, 
field management, and administrative staff) from participating in  any 
viatical or life settlements transaction—even if the policy being transacted 
is not a Principal Life policy.
113 Principal Life prohibits any broker from 
participating in a viatical or life settlement transaction involving a 
Principal Life policy if either a) the policyholder intends to transfer only a 
portion of the policy to the purchaser, b) the purchaser sells interests in 
policies to investors, or c) if the insured is eligible for accelerated death 
benefits from Principal Life.
114  
These prohibitions by incumbent life insurance carriers are 
anticompetitive: they seek to erect a barrier to entry against viatical and life 
settlement firms for all policies that the incumbents could potentially 
repurchase. In addition, by forcing agents to restrict their client advice to 
an incomplete array of options (even when the agent knows that a viatical 
or life settlement might best meet the client’s needs), these prohibitions 
risk undermining the credibility of carriers’ life insurance agents and 
exposing them to legal liability.
115  Finally, these prohibitions are over-
reaching in scope: restrictions on the ability of agents or brokers to assist 
clients in the sale of life insurance policies issued by other carriers strongly 
suggests an industry-wide boycott of viatical and life settlement firms. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The assignability of a life insurance policy is a benefit that a consumer 
acquires when he or she becomes a policyholder. Life insurance companies 
are attempting to foreclose the emerging secondary market for life 
insurance by lobbying for barriers to entry into the market, by boycotting 
life settlement firms, and in some cases, by preventing their agents from 
informing policyholders of their right to contract with a life settlement 
company. All of these actions are designed to interfere with the 
assignability benefit that policyholders l egally acquire upon purchasing a 
policy from a life insurance company. 
Incumbent life insurance carriers argue, somewhat paradoxically, that 
their efforts to impede policyholders’ legal exercise of their assignability 
benefits will actually improve consumer welfare. This argument is 
supported by the erroneous and self-serving contention that entry into the 
secondary market makes consumers worse off. In this paper, we have 
demonstrated that a competitive secondary market for life insurance 
policies improves the welfare of both new and existing policyholders. It is 
therefore in the interest of lawmakers to develop regulations that protect 
the interests of consumers and investors in the secondary market. Because 
participation and investment in the secondary market for life insurance 
policies is pro-competitive, lawmakers should design regulations that 
encourage, rather than dissuade, such participation or investment. 
 